Political Connections, Institutional Environments and Firm Performance : Evidence from China Listed Firms
碩士 === 國立中興大學 === 財務金融系所 === 100 === The purpose of the dissertation is to study the effect of different types of political relationship on the corporate performance. The samples of this dissertation are selected from listed companies, which based on Shanghai Stock Exchange A-share from 2008 to...
Main Authors: | , |
---|---|
Other Authors: | |
Format: | Others |
Language: | zh-TW |
Published: |
2012
|
Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/94021323302970856150 |
id |
ndltd-TW-100NCHU5304006 |
---|---|
record_format |
oai_dc |
spelling |
ndltd-TW-100NCHU53040062017-04-29T04:31:07Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/94021323302970856150 Political Connections, Institutional Environments and Firm Performance : Evidence from China Listed Firms 政治關係,制度環境和公司績效:來自中國上市公司的實證研究 Ying Wang 汪穎 碩士 國立中興大學 財務金融系所 100 The purpose of the dissertation is to study the effect of different types of political relationship on the corporate performance. The samples of this dissertation are selected from listed companies, which based on Shanghai Stock Exchange A-share from 2008 to 2010. In addition, this report is to analyze the correlation between political relationship and corporate performance by institutional environment indicators in different areas of China. The result of this study shows that it is most positive correlation between corporate performance and top executives who used to be deputies of People''s Congress. This indicates the Board of directors or CEOs who used to involve in deputies of People''s Congress have significant influence. In brief, the correlation of deputies in China would assist the company in a certain level. Furthermore, this report includes the correlation between political relationship and corporate performance by institutional environment indicators in different areas of China. The differences between the previous conclusions disclose that top executives who used to involve with the administrative officials affected more on corporate performance compare to those who used to be deputies of People''s Congress. Moreover, the study cover the distinct of local government law between different region and found that the less a corporate is protected by the local government law, the higher the political relationship of top executives effect the corporate performance. Likewise, the more the government intervenes in a corporation, the more the corporate performance raise. In conclusion, the result of this study proves that the local government has more influence on the corporate performance than the central government does. Shuh-Chyi Doong 董澍琦 2012 學位論文 ; thesis 49 zh-TW |
collection |
NDLTD |
language |
zh-TW |
format |
Others
|
sources |
NDLTD |
description |
碩士 === 國立中興大學 === 財務金融系所 === 100 === The purpose of the dissertation is to study the effect of different types of political relationship on the corporate performance. The samples of this dissertation are selected from listed companies, which based on Shanghai Stock Exchange A-share from 2008 to 2010. In addition, this report is to analyze the correlation between political relationship and corporate performance by institutional environment indicators in different areas of China. The result of this study shows that it is most positive correlation between corporate performance and top executives who used to be deputies of People''s Congress. This indicates the Board of directors or CEOs who used to involve in deputies of People''s Congress have significant influence. In brief, the correlation of deputies in China would assist the company in a certain level.
Furthermore, this report includes the correlation between political relationship and corporate performance by institutional environment indicators in different areas of China. The differences between the previous conclusions disclose that top executives who used to involve with the administrative officials affected more on corporate performance compare to those who used to be deputies of People''s Congress. Moreover, the study cover the distinct of local government law between different region and found that the less a corporate is protected by the local government law, the higher the political relationship of top executives effect the corporate performance. Likewise, the more the government intervenes in a corporation, the more the corporate performance raise. In conclusion, the result of this study proves that the local government has more influence on the corporate performance than the central government does.
|
author2 |
Shuh-Chyi Doong |
author_facet |
Shuh-Chyi Doong Ying Wang 汪穎 |
author |
Ying Wang 汪穎 |
spellingShingle |
Ying Wang 汪穎 Political Connections, Institutional Environments and Firm Performance : Evidence from China Listed Firms |
author_sort |
Ying Wang |
title |
Political Connections, Institutional Environments and Firm Performance : Evidence from China Listed Firms |
title_short |
Political Connections, Institutional Environments and Firm Performance : Evidence from China Listed Firms |
title_full |
Political Connections, Institutional Environments and Firm Performance : Evidence from China Listed Firms |
title_fullStr |
Political Connections, Institutional Environments and Firm Performance : Evidence from China Listed Firms |
title_full_unstemmed |
Political Connections, Institutional Environments and Firm Performance : Evidence from China Listed Firms |
title_sort |
political connections, institutional environments and firm performance : evidence from china listed firms |
publishDate |
2012 |
url |
http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/94021323302970856150 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT yingwang politicalconnectionsinstitutionalenvironmentsandfirmperformanceevidencefromchinalistedfirms AT wāngyǐng politicalconnectionsinstitutionalenvironmentsandfirmperformanceevidencefromchinalistedfirms AT yingwang zhèngzhìguānxìzhìdùhuánjìnghégōngsījīxiàoláizìzhōngguóshàngshìgōngsīdeshízhèngyánjiū AT wāngyǐng zhèngzhìguānxìzhìdùhuánjìnghégōngsījīxiàoláizìzhōngguóshàngshìgōngsīdeshízhèngyánjiū |
_version_ |
1718444903660257280 |