Defaulting tour operators with asymmetric information--a perspective of risk management

• Main Authors: Hsin-yu Hu, 胡馨予
• Other Authors: Yen-ming Chen
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2012
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/83836076731220498413

碩士 === 國立高雄第一科技大學 === 運籌管理研究所 === 100 === This study is aimed to explore the tourism market exist defaulting tour operators with asymmetric information. Some hotels want to cooperate with defaulting tour operators to balance with the off-season gains and increase the income of the peak season. But it will face the risks of bad debt and delinquent by cooperation. This study used mechanism design theory and the impact of bad debts to analysis contract design. The results showed that tour operators would be honest to contracts by mechanism design theory. In addition hotels should be adopted transfer risk strategy into contracts design with high reward and low risk. With high reward and high risk, hotel should be adopted self-supporting strategy into contracts design. And hotel should be adopted risk aversion strategy with low reward. Furthermore, hotels should provide more benefits to tour operators whether their market share increase or solvency upgrade.