Why a parent company chooses external managers as executives of its new venture?

• Main Authors: Shu-Fu, Lin, 林書甫
• Other Authors: Min-Ping, Kang
• Format: Others
• Language: en_US
• Published: 2011
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/8k6328

碩士 === 國立臺灣師範大學 === 全球經營與策略研究所 === 100 === This study provides an integrated framework, based on resource-based view, transaction cost theory, agency theory and the perspective of social capital to explain the managerial practice of why a parent company chooses external manager instead of internal employee as the executives of new ventures. Due to human resources are not completely controlled by firms. We found that in practical managerial decisions, when parent company is processing diversifications or establishing subsidiaries, the consideration of executives of new ventures is not only measured by the comparative capabilities of external or internal candidates, but also by the economic cost of using human resources. This study explains how firms change their perspective of choosing executives according to the variations of environments or their self-condition. Given that firms will make their deployment of managerial resources more appropriate to increase its economic value. This study provides evidences that although firms are not only considering to deploy its’ managerial resources to create benefits, but also considering to reduce the controlling costs of deploying human resources. However, when firms have the abilities or experiences to overcome/reduce the costs of using human resource. Firms will concentrate more on how candidates contribute to increase benefits, and care less about reducing the controlling costs of using human resources.