A Study on the Form of Delegation - the Case in Health Market

• Main Authors: Ting-Hsuan Li, 李庭萱
• Other Authors: Yi-Heng Chen
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2012
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/98172734837439548133

碩士 === 淡江大學 === 產業經濟學系碩士班 === 100 === 　　This model established a health care market with two hospitals. Each hospital has one physician in charge. The hospital provides two kinds of substituable medicine. One is called general medicine which is subsidized by Bureau of National Health Insurance. The other is called special medicine which is paid fully by the patient. The hospital owner can apply two different incentive contracts on its physician, either its rival’s profit or the hosipital’s own quantity sold. The market is playing the Cournot quantity competition. We found that both the hospital owner and the physician will prefer that the rival hospital also use the incentive contract, as well as the delegation design is the hospital’s own quantity. Also, when the market demand is large enough, the result holds from the social point of view.