Summary: | 碩士 === 淡江大學 === 資訊管理學系碩士班 === 100 === The development of E-Negotiation is still growing as various Negotiation Supporting Systems are also being offered one after another. Among various Supporting Systems, nothing is getting more attention than opponent’s preferences predictions. If we understand opponent’s preferences, we can get the chance to lead the negotiation process and achieve the preset goal. Though scholars have offered many methods to predict opponent’s preferences, most of them focus on accuracy, rather than knowing what tactics to respond one understood their preferences which end up reducing the effects of predictions. In regard to this fact, this research dedicates to develop opponent’s preference prediction which have the ability of dynamic tactics, it can attain the predicted negotiation outcome. In order to attain this goal. First, we use the negotiation model which put forward by Faratin as base, working in coordination which Genetic algorithm to predict possible opponent’s preference. To describe negotiation’s attitude, we design several object function to guide the process of negotiation. When doing the adjustment of dynamic tactics, we find out practicable method of tactic adjustment by simulative negotiation inside on the basis of predictive result to confirm with objective standard. To testing the validity of the method, this research has proceeded abundant of simulated experiments. The result of the research shows that no matter what kind of tactics’ goal the negotiation have chosen , they can an upgrade their own utility value in the side which has doing prediction. When both sides use opponent’s preferences prediction and also make selfish as their goal, it can get the best combination of utility. If we choose mutually beneficial or generosity as the long-term object, we can reduce the rounds of negotiation and raise the rate of success at the same time. The effect can obtain further promotion when matching up dynamic tactics. Then, it reveals the necessity and validity in adjustment of dynamic tactics.
|