| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立中正大學 === 哲學研究所 === 100 === Abstract
This thesis focuses on the interplay between individual rationality and reasons. In this thesis, I add the account of “the sufficient condition of action” in Bernard Williams’ argument, by arguing the inferential relationship among four factors: the desire, the motivation, the reason, and the action. Moreover, I advise a revision of Bernard Williams’ distinction of reasons. Finally, I extend the claim of Bernard Williams, and review the argument of “properly bringing up” with the concept of “phronimos” by John McDowell for some external, ethical reasons. In analyzing the philosophical discourse of reasons between Bernard Williams and John McDowell, it reveals some problem about the presuppositions of deliberation in deliberative democracy. The realism of an ideal agent in an ideal political model will fail, under inappropriate operations and inadequate definitions, and this realistic failure is of methodological problems, which based on the metaphysical presuppositions of the RATIONALITY of a RATIONAL agent in politics.
Keywords: motivation, reason, rationality, deliberation.
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