Characteristics of independent director and overvalued equity:Evidence from listed electronic industry in Taiwan.

• Main Author: 吳柏勳
• Other Authors: 郭弘卿
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/35625662781862395829

碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 會計研究所 === 101 === This study is based on the hypothesis of the agency costs of overvalued equity that Jensen (2005) proposed and examines the relation between overvalued equity and three characteristics of independent director. Three characteristics of independent director are financial or accounting expertise, average tenure and busy independent director. The sample of this study collected from listed electronic companies in Taiwan from 2010 to 2011.The empirical results are summarized as follows: 1.The higher percentage of independent director with financial or accounting expertise , more likely to restrain the extent of overvalued equity. 2.Average tenure of independent director and the percentage of busy independent director have no significant relation with the extent of overvalued equity.