Low-Complexity Countermeasure Algorithms against Power Attacks for ECC

• Main Authors: Szu-HanHuang, 黃思翰
• Other Authors: Ming-Der Shieh
• Format: Others
• Language: en_US
• Published: 2013
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/31492529529803923314

碩士 === 國立成功大學 === 電機工程學系碩博士班 === 101 === The requirement for security communications are increasing significantly due to the frequently use of electronic business. The elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) gains benefit on key length in contrast to that in Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) cryptography, the most popular used public key cryptosystem. And the difference between key lengths grows while the security level increases. In recent years, side channel attack becomes a major threat for cryptography. It uses information leaked while the cryptographic device is performing encryption or decryption to crack the system. And power analysis attack is the most common used. We proposed two countermeasures against several kinds of power attack. The first one is random key splitting method while the second countermeasure is random delay method. Those two countermeasures are able to prevent SPA, DPA and ZPA. And the timing overheads for scalar multiplication in both 160-bit GF(p)及GF(2163)are lower thanrelated works.