| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立高雄第一科技大學 === 風險管理與保險研究所 === 101 === In this study, empirical analyse various factors of claims for individual life insurance, injury insurance and medical insurance, supposing adverse selection exists in the personal insurance market, although everyone has insurance requirement, but because of the high risk of the insured'' speculations, and the insurance company consider the loss ratio under the information asymmetry situation, the result is to increase premiums to cope with the condition, then good quality insured will reduce insuring, those will join this insurance market is the expected loss greater than the total premiums paid, resulting the vicious cycle in the insurance market. This article hopes to understand whether the adverse selection exists in life insurance market by analyzing the various reasons of claims.
Therefore, this study uses the relevant data of communications at the C insurance company , by statistical analysis, trying to figure out the characteristics of adverse selection policyholders, the empirical results will help to the insurance company to make adverse selection risk management and control strategies, in the future regardless when the insured the information disclosure of the insurance documents or claims investigation after the accident, that can provide the insurance company in the underwriting and claims stage to make appropriate screening to allows insurance company more efficient in risk management, and the ultimate goal of reducing the probability of abnormal claims is to lower costs and thus make all the goodness policyholders would have fair premium for insurance products.
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