Decision Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory Based Network Process for Defining Spectrum Auction Mechanisms

碩士 === 國立臺灣師範大學 === 應用電子科技學系 === 101 === Maximization of the bandwidth utilization efficiency is the ultimate goal for the telecommunication spectrum management policy. An appropriate spectrum auction mechanism is essential for the maximization of spectrum utilizations and government income. Various...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Hong-Ci Lang, 郎洪賜
Other Authors: Chia-Pin Wang
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2013
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/84141947060090030770
Description
Summary:碩士 === 國立臺灣師範大學 === 應用電子科技學系 === 101 === Maximization of the bandwidth utilization efficiency is the ultimate goal for the telecommunication spectrum management policy. An appropriate spectrum auction mechanism is essential for the maximization of spectrum utilizations and government income. Various spectrum auction mechanisms are available. How the most suitable spectrum auction mechanism can be designed and selected is always the essential issues for national governments. A well-designed auction mechanism will motivate telecommunication service provider’s interests in bidding. Firms with better operation capability always have the intention to pay a higher price to obtain license. The firms which can pay with the highest price usually get the usage right of the spectrum and thus, contribute considerable revenue to the national government. Albeit important, such issues have seldom been addressed and have no definite answers. In order to define a decision making framework for the selection of an appropriate spectrum auction mechanism, the DEMATEL based Network Process (DNP) will be proposed. The criteria will first be summarized by literature review and then confirmed based on experts’ opinions by using the modified Delphi method. Then, the influence weights being associated with the criteria will be derived by DNP. The Vlse Kriterijumska Optimizacija I Kompromisno Resenje (VIKOR) will then be introduced for performance evaluation by aforementioned weighting to define a suitable auction mechanism. An empirical study based on opinions being provided by experts from Taiwanese government, academic as well as research institutes will be introduced to verify the feasibility of the analytic framework. The empirical study results demonstrate that information is the most important aspect, while the collusion on bidders of information is the most influential criteria which may influence the decision of spectrum auction mechanism. Further, the open ascending-bid is selected as the most suitable spectrum auction model being derived by VIKOR. Based on the empirical study results, the proposed criteria and derived open ascending-bid mechanism can serve as the basis for governmental telecommunication policy definitions for the next generation wireless telecommunication spectrum allocations .