Controlling Inventory Markdown Risks of Channel Stuffing by the Apportionment of Compensation Cost

碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 工業工程學研究所 === 101 === This study discusses on channel stuffing motivated by an agent: shipping excess inventory to the downstream channel. Channel stuffing allows an agent to report sales in excess of real demand in order to get more commission. But there is much more remaining stoc...

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Main Authors: Che-Wei Hsu, 許哲瑋
Other Authors: 周雍強
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2013
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/96874963490777801474
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spelling ndltd-TW-101NTU050300562015-10-13T23:05:30Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/96874963490777801474 Controlling Inventory Markdown Risks of Channel Stuffing by the Apportionment of Compensation Cost 以補償成本分攤機制控管通路塞貨之存貨減價風險 Che-Wei Hsu 許哲瑋 碩士 國立臺灣大學 工業工程學研究所 101 This study discusses on channel stuffing motivated by an agent: shipping excess inventory to the downstream channel. Channel stuffing allows an agent to report sales in excess of real demand in order to get more commission. But there is much more remaining stock of a dealer at the end of selling period. If the product life cycle is short, the remaining stock will be significantly price depreciated. The dealer will be damaged owing to holding the remaining stock. Once the dealer takes a huge inventory risk caused by channel stuffing, it will not accept the padding quantities unless getting a risk sharing agreement (i.e. a markdown money contract) with the manufacturer. Then manufacturer has to compensate the inventory markdown losses of dealer, which goes against the purpose of manufacturer’s profit. Since it’s not easy to find out the agent’s padding quantities, there is a classical agent problem between agent and manufacturer. Base on the above-mentioned, this study in the view of manufacturer to control inventory markdown risks caused by channel stuffing. In our model, manufacturer and agent share the inventory markdown risks together by the apportionment of compensation cost. So that manufacturer can control the padding quantities indirectly. According to the result of numerical analysis, manufacturer could improve its profit with a proper degree of padding quantities when the product price depreciation is slight. On the contrary, manufacturer should induce agent to reduce the padding quantities when the product price depreciation is serious. In addition, we also know that manufacturer should induce more pads of agent when dealer’s original order up to level is low. At the result of keeping the constant full-fill rate by dealer, the more variance of demand the more extra profit due to channel stuffing. In conclusion, manufacturer could effectively control inventory markdown risks by the apportionment of compensation cost. This mechanism ensures the completeness of an incentive plan of commission compensation. 周雍強 2013 學位論文 ; thesis 53 zh-TW
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language zh-TW
format Others
sources NDLTD
description 碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 工業工程學研究所 === 101 === This study discusses on channel stuffing motivated by an agent: shipping excess inventory to the downstream channel. Channel stuffing allows an agent to report sales in excess of real demand in order to get more commission. But there is much more remaining stock of a dealer at the end of selling period. If the product life cycle is short, the remaining stock will be significantly price depreciated. The dealer will be damaged owing to holding the remaining stock. Once the dealer takes a huge inventory risk caused by channel stuffing, it will not accept the padding quantities unless getting a risk sharing agreement (i.e. a markdown money contract) with the manufacturer. Then manufacturer has to compensate the inventory markdown losses of dealer, which goes against the purpose of manufacturer’s profit. Since it’s not easy to find out the agent’s padding quantities, there is a classical agent problem between agent and manufacturer. Base on the above-mentioned, this study in the view of manufacturer to control inventory markdown risks caused by channel stuffing. In our model, manufacturer and agent share the inventory markdown risks together by the apportionment of compensation cost. So that manufacturer can control the padding quantities indirectly. According to the result of numerical analysis, manufacturer could improve its profit with a proper degree of padding quantities when the product price depreciation is slight. On the contrary, manufacturer should induce agent to reduce the padding quantities when the product price depreciation is serious. In addition, we also know that manufacturer should induce more pads of agent when dealer’s original order up to level is low. At the result of keeping the constant full-fill rate by dealer, the more variance of demand the more extra profit due to channel stuffing. In conclusion, manufacturer could effectively control inventory markdown risks by the apportionment of compensation cost. This mechanism ensures the completeness of an incentive plan of commission compensation.
author2 周雍強
author_facet 周雍強
Che-Wei Hsu
許哲瑋
author Che-Wei Hsu
許哲瑋
spellingShingle Che-Wei Hsu
許哲瑋
Controlling Inventory Markdown Risks of Channel Stuffing by the Apportionment of Compensation Cost
author_sort Che-Wei Hsu
title Controlling Inventory Markdown Risks of Channel Stuffing by the Apportionment of Compensation Cost
title_short Controlling Inventory Markdown Risks of Channel Stuffing by the Apportionment of Compensation Cost
title_full Controlling Inventory Markdown Risks of Channel Stuffing by the Apportionment of Compensation Cost
title_fullStr Controlling Inventory Markdown Risks of Channel Stuffing by the Apportionment of Compensation Cost
title_full_unstemmed Controlling Inventory Markdown Risks of Channel Stuffing by the Apportionment of Compensation Cost
title_sort controlling inventory markdown risks of channel stuffing by the apportionment of compensation cost
publishDate 2013
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/96874963490777801474
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