The Bargaining Power of Industry Specialization Auditor on Audit Pricing-The Effect of Industry Competitiveness

• Main Authors: Chen Cheng-Yen, 陳政彥
• Other Authors: Lin Hsiu-Feng
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2013
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/q5ufpy

碩士 === 東海大學 === 會計學系 === 101 === The operation risks and characteristics are different from companies. With the complex circumstances, the auditors have focus on industry knowledge and audit skills to ensure the audit quality. The industry specialists have more science and audit experience in particular industry, there is benefit for auditors to audit efficiency and quality. But I concentrate on the bargain power of industry specialist on audit pricing. I use the market share and client leadership for measuring the industry specialists, it’s different for past studies that client leadership would discount the bargain power of auditors. I put attention that the auditors who audit the client leadership would improve the bargain power to the other client in specific industry. The bargain power would be transformed by auditors, clients, and industry competitiveness. I use the high-dimensional fixed effects model to analysis the bargain power, and compare with bargain power in different competitiveness. I use the samples which have fee disclosure on TSE and OTC listed firms from 2002 to 2011. My result is fitted on hypothesis that industry specialists have higher bargain power than other auditors, and would earn the fee premium, no matter what proxies (market share and client leadership) are. But clients have advantage on audit pricing in Taiwan, fee premium would be influenced not only size of client but also industry competitiveness. Auditors could offer client leadership the fee discount, but the auditors who audit the client leadership would earn fee premium from the other client which size near the client leadership in same industry. Including the industry competitiveness, the specialists who audit client leadership have more premium in the low competitiveness, and the specialists have discount for client leadership in the same time. The bargain power of specialists who measured by clients leadership would increase as high competitiveness, but specialists who measured by market share would decrease. There are different implications for the generally varied proxies of industry specialists.