| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立中正大學 === 會計與資訊科技研究所 === 102 === After the Financial Crisis, institutional investors take more notice of corporate governance and operating performance. Any decision executed by the manager will affect the company’s development and ultimately affect the shareholders’ own interests. The study employs the event study to investigate the announcement of CEO turnover effects on shareholder’s wealth while considering the relationship between institutional investors and the CEO turnover. The results show that CEO turnover will affect market investors to evaluate the company’s operating performance; it generates abnormal returns around one day, after a day, after five days and after seven days. The changes of institutional investors’ shareholding proportion or an action of reducing holdings don’t affect the CEO turnover. However, institutional investors’ action of reducing shareholdings affects the shareholder’s wealth form announcement of CEO turnover. It implies that investors will measure the company’s value and operating performance via institutional investors’ actions of reducing shareholdings. Hence, the study suggests companies should describe the contents of CEO turnover exhaustively in order to release the correct information to investors. In addition, the classification of CEO turnover causes should have second proofs to distinguish whether the CEO turnover is involuntary.
|
|---|
