| Summary: | 碩士 === 大葉大學 === 企業管理學系碩士班 === 103 === ABSTRACT
This study explores the relationship between the central agency problem and the disclosure of information, and also investigates that the role of institutional investors and their interaction effect with central agency problem. The research period covers from year 2005 to 2010 for all Taiwanese listed companies. Data source is derived from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database and governmental "Listed Companies Information Disclosure Evaluation" system. The empirical results show that those companies with serious central agency problem have no significant relationship with their responding degree of information disclosure. However, institutional investors did play a role for supervising information disclosure. The institutional ownership is positively related with information disclosure. Furthermore, this study examines the interaction effect of the central agency problem. The evidence shows that the supervisory power of institutional investors is not strong yet. This finding may imply that institutional ownership is not high enough in Taiwan, unable to reverse the insignificant relationship between agency problem and information disclosure.
Key Words:Central agency problem, Institutional Investor, Information Disclosure
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