| Summary: | 碩士 === 大葉大學 === 管理學院碩士在職專班 === 102 === This paper examines the relationship between ownership structure and independent director. The related data is collected from Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) data bank during 2002 to 2012. This study employs the methodology of ordinary least square and logistic regressions and selects a sample with size of 12,214. Our findings show that (1) the higher proportions of director shareholding will reduce the possibility of independent directors appointment; (2) the higher equity pledge ratio of directors does not tend to appointment more independent directors; (3) manager’s ownership proportions, institutional investor proportions and deviation between cash flow right and controlling right have significant positive relationship with independent directors appointment. As for the sub-sample, the results show that the higher the block shareholding ratio and manager’s ownership proportions, the lower the appointment of independent directors. The ownership structure and voluntary appointment of independent directors were positively related. Finally, the control variables of company size and debt ratio have significant negative relationship with independent directors’ appointment. In sum, the equity pledge ratio, equity pledge ratio, block shareholding ratio, manager’s ownership proportions, institutional investor proportions and deviation between cash flow right and controlling right are the important factors affecting voluntary appointment of independent director.
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