| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立高雄應用科技大學 === 財富與稅務管理系 === 102 === This study explored innovation performance of R&D and patents, to investigate how the high-tech industries improved efficiency of R&D and innovation through corporate governance. Whether the investor reaction to innovation will vary with different Board members. This study collected data from the technology industry with companies listed between 2000-2012. Empirical results showed that directors and supervisors on the basis of their own interests, they control innovation activities. The Boards didn't supervise activity in the early innovation process because of high cost and limited interest from the Board. The Board was willing to supervise in the late stages of innovation because of substantive patents. However, empirical results did not reach a significant level. Independent Directors did not help R&D and patents produce any operating income. This is likely that independent directors were not involved in company management. So they couldn't manage how the innovation investment enhanced substantive business performance. Therefore, the empirical results didn't meet expectations. However, independent directors can urge the company to innovate in the stage that R&D converted patents. Empirical results did not reach a significant level. About market evaluation, investors couldn't know whether the Board effectively improved innovation performance. After that, the company achieved substantial patent, compared with growth of the company. So the Board Intervention had market evaluation inconsistent. Empirical results did not reach a significant level. In contrast, the market evaluation was consistent with the involvement of independent directors. Empirical results reached a significant level. Investors thought supervisory functions of independent directors was more reliable.
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