The Impact of Family Firms on Mergers and Acquiring Performance: The Moderating Effect of Corporate Governance and Disclosure Transparency

• Main Authors: Shih-Wen Chang, 張思雯
• Other Authors: Ching-Wen Chi
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2014
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/37apv3

碩士 === 銘傳大學 === 國際企業學系碩士在職專班 === 102 === Family Firms play an important role in today’s world economy under facing inevitable international competition in the history of international trade. To stimulate growth, family firms often take strategies like merger and acquisition (M&;A) to achieve integration and reorganization. Although many researchers examined regarding the firm performance on M&;A, little e focused on family firms. This study aims to discuss the relationship between Publicly Traded family firms and M&;A performance. Use the related party transaction, the degree of deviation between ownership and management power, if chairman of the board also serves CEO, the ratio of outside directors, and company information transparency as Moderator variables; investigate if the variables have moderating effect between family firms and M&;A performance. Data for this study were collected from a sample of 205 Publicly Traded Companies in Taiwan between the period of 2003 and 2012 and analyzed using a hierarchical regression analysis. The results of this study suggests: (1) Family firms have a higher short term M&;A performance. (2) The higher the deviation between ownership and management power, and the higher the ratio is on related party financing, the shore term M&;A performance are higher. (3) The short term M&;A performance is higher when the family controlled shareholders in family corporation takes the interest of the whole company into consideration in decision making. The hypothesis of Moderating Effect on the ratio of outside directors and chairman of the board also serves as CEO are not supported in this study. Thus, we suggested that the authorities should be careful on who is chosen as manager and board member in a family firms since family firms can often influence who is appointed as the manager or the board member.