| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 外交研究所 === 102 === This research tries to analyze how the mainland China’s noninterference principle, which has been the core concept of its foreign policy since 1950s, transforms with its diplomatic adjustment in the post cold war era. At the beginning of Jiang Zemin’s tenure, Chinese Communist Party was not only suffering from the international sanctions over the Tiananmen Square crackdown of 1989, but shocked by the Collapse of Communism between 1989 and 1991. All of these events let CCP leaders attempt to consolidate its power by focusing on economic reforms inside the country and keeping a low profile attitude towards foreign affairs, also known as Tao Guang Yang Hui Strategy. It was this thought that makes mainland China to reinforce its noninterference principle. However, this passive attitude faced many obstacles during Hu Jintao’s tenure. The first is its “going out” strategy brings a lot of oversea interests spreading the world. The second is mainland China's growing power push it to bear more international responsibility to show its good intention. These obstacles make mainland China has to interact with the international society more frequently than before. In the meantime, this adjustment asked new CCP leaders to revise the existing rigid “noninterference” principle to make it more flexible.
The research also examines how mainland China involved in the Cambodia in 1993 and the Libya in 2011 to show the subtle differences of noninterference principle between Jiang and Hu’s tenures and evaluate the meaning behind these adjustments. Firstly, the research found that getting involved in Cambodia was the only one case in Jiang’s tenure and it was ascribed to special demands, such as solving border disputes in the neighborhood and trying to pursue sanctions relief by supporting for U.N. intervention. However, the Libya case was the latest one among many that mainland China involved during Hu’s tenure. Unlike the Jiang’s tenure, there are plenty of structural pressures pushing Hu’s cabinet to ease the noninterference principle, such as protecting the oversea interests and bearing more international responsibility. Secondly, it unveiled mainland China deal with these pressures by showing its consistent stand that intervention should not ruin the stability in the recipient country, and must choose the less compelling measures. Thirdly, it argues that there are more interests calculating than responsibility taking when CCP leaders make their decisions to involve in other countries’ affairs. This corresponds to the opinion that there is more tactical than fundamental changes in mainland China’s diplomatic adjustment.
|
|---|
