Taiwan’s Strategic Choice Imported in Beef Negotiation between Taiwan and United States: Two-Level Game Analysis

• Main Authors: Tzu-Chun Chen, 陳姿君
• Other Authors: 袁鶴齡
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2014
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/47q253

碩士 === 國立中興大學 === 國家政策與公共事務研究所 === 102 === Having been long time, using international negotiation has become a main method to solve controversial affairs between state and state. Compared to deal with domestic affairs, sovereign state processes higher autonomy to deal with foreign affairs through international negotiation, but the more developing of the democratization and civil society, the more affected by domestic factors. Because the framework of interaction between international factors and domestic factors is an effective approach, when the boundary between international line and domestic line become blurred, it is not important no matter what domestic factors affect international factors (inside-out) or international factors affect domestic factors (outside-in). By adopting the two-level game approach to analyze international negotiation, Robert D. Putnam has successfully linked domestic factors with international ones in the study of international negotiation in 1988. The approach suggests two convincing concepts, which are “win-sets” and “political indifference curve for two-issue negotiation.” By using multi-issue linkage strategy, both sides of negotiators can also work out win-win solution. Based on Putnam’s two level game hypotheses, this paper intends to better interpreting international negotiation framework. The negotiation of United States beef import issues is not only free trade agreement between Taiwan and U.S.A. or just a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, TIFA between Taiwan and U.S.A., but also involves food hygiene, arms sales & security, and Asia-Pacific regional integration issues, so the negotiation can easier distinguish the characteristics of multi-issue negotiations. In other words, this negotiation involves domestic politics issues and international political economy issues. This study uses two-level game framework to analyze international and domestic level factors which affect the outcomes of the negotiation. From the case study of United States beef import, we could understand the relationship of between Taiwan and U.S.A. and explain Taiwan’s strategy choosing in government and domestic constituency dimension. In order to develop the paper, the first of all is to address background, purposes, and questions of this study. The second part is to understand the elements of international negotiation and the core concepts of two-level game approach by investigating relative literature. The third part is to explain the background of the negotiation of United States beef import issues in 2009. The fourth part is to analyze the interaction between Taiwan and U.S.A., as well as to analyze Taiwan’s strategies through Two-Level Game Framework. The last parts are strategic thinking about this negotiation, policy suggestion and conclusion. Having been long time, using international negotiation has become a main method to solve controversial affairs between state and state. Compared to deal with domestic affairs, sovereign state processes higher autonomy to deal with foreign affairs through international negotiation, but the more developing of the democratization and civil society, the more affected by domestic factors. Because the framework of interaction between international factors and domestic factors is an effective approach, when the boundary between international line and domestic line become blurred, it is not important no matter what domestic factors affect international factors (inside-out) or international factors affect domestic factors (outside-in). By adopting the two-level game approach to analyze international negotiation, Robert D. Putnam has successfully linked domestic factors with international ones in the study of international negotiation in 1988. The approach suggests two convincing concepts, which are “win-sets” and “political indifference curve for two-issue negotiation.” By using multi-issue linkage strategy, both sides of negotiators can also work out win-win solution. Based on Putnam’s two level game hypotheses, this paper intends to better interpreting international negotiation framework. The negotiation of United States beef import issues is not only free trade agreement between Taiwan and U.S.A. or just a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, TIFA between Taiwan and U.S.A., but also involves food hygiene, arms sales & security, and Asia-Pacific regional integration issues, so the negotiation can easier distinguish the characteristics of multi-issue negotiations. In other words, this negotiation involves domestic politics issues and international political economy issues. This study uses two-level game framework to analyze international and domestic level factors which affect the outcomes of the negotiation. From the case study of United States beef import, we could understand the relationship of between Taiwan and U.S.A. and explain Taiwan’s strategy choosing in government and domestic constituency dimension. In order to develop the paper, the first of all is to address background, purposes, and questions of this study. The second part is to understand the elements of international negotiation and the core concepts of two-level game approach by investigating relative literature. The third part is to explain the background of the negotiation of United States beef import issues in 2009. The fourth part is to analyze the interaction between Taiwan and U.S.A., as well as to analyze Taiwan’s strategies through Two-Level Game Framework. The last parts are strategic thinking about this negotiation, policy suggestion and conclusion.