A study on Bundling Decisions and Selling Types of Special Goods in Online Auctions

• Main Authors: Min-ShengYang, 楊閔升
• Other Authors: Yeu-Shiang Huang
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2014
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/87286691876996882365

碩士 === 國立成功大學 === 工業與資訊管理學系 === 102 === This study considers the problem in which a revenue-maximizing seller wants to sell a variety of associated unique products. This study proposes an analytical model to address the following questions: (i) What is the optimal bidding price for the bidders? (ii) What is the optimal selling strategy under the second-highest price online auction? (iii) What is the optimal auction arrangement when the seller has more than one unit to sell? Multi-units in simultaneous auctions or Multi-units simultaneous in single-auction? This study investigates the optimal equilibrium price for the seller to make more effective decisions when constructing online auctions with an aim to maximize the seller’s revenue and the buyer’s utility. The results indicate that the bundling auction of the two products is superior to that of separating when the correlation between two associated products is strong or when there are only few bidders. When the product has several units to sell, it is optimal to auction product via multi-units in simultaneous auctions when both the numbers of products and bidders are few.