Rethinking the Culpability of Insider Trading by Game Theory

• Main Authors: Chang, Tun-Wei, 張敦威
• Other Authors: Lin, Chih-Chieh
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2013
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/84425311381963897229

碩士 === 國立交通大學 === 科技法律研究所 === 102 === Since Securities and Exchange Act article 157-1, so-called “insider trading rule (ITR)”, was enforced in 1988, this rule was always arguable, whatever positive or negative arguments, in academic and judicial profession. Under the premise that there are many foreign or domestic studies, this article would discuss some ITR issues through economic analysis. First, it would be demonstrated how insider trading decreases market efficiency by applying game theoretical approach, so it should be prohibited. Second, the effect of current ITR would be analyzed by cost-benefit analysis approach, and it appeared that imprisonment would ex post bring with social cost. However, criminal punishment is necessary to deter crime ex ante. In the part of empirical study, the effect of amendment under severe criminality policy and the amendment of plea bargaining in 2004 would be surveyed. We discovered that it could not be reached the goal of deterrence under severe criminality policy, but it was helpful for prosecution and trial by the application of the plea bargaining rule, especially in the situation of joint offenders. Besides the qualitative analysis, the problems existed in the application of ITR would be discussed by case study research through “BenQ case” and “Green Point case”. By case study, it was discovered that the difference of the result in IT case mostly came from the difference of judges’ objective value. After discussion, there are some comments of the improvement of the procedure law in IT case.