A Survey of U.S. Insider Trading Law Enforcement: SEC Cases from 2009 to 2012

• Main Authors: Eric Hung, 洪碩甫
• Other Authors: Lin, Chien-Chung
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2014
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/r23jky

碩士 === 國立交通大學 === 科技法律研究所 === 102 === Whether or not insider trading should subject to regulation is still debatable, however, countries around the world have leaning toward prohibiting insider trading in order to maintain a fair and orderly market. Therefore, this Article does not argue the appropriateness of prohibiting insider trading, but rather accepting the fact that insider trading is made illegal in major securities markets. And under this premise, this Article aims at observing how the securities agency, especially the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, enforces its law as well as what constitutes an ideal way of enforcement. Every countries has its own way of combating insider trading, and the United States adopted a two-layered structure which allows government intervention(includes civil and criminal) and private litigation at the same time. It nonetheless involves cooperation among multiple agencies with Securities and Exchange Commission leading the direction of both policy-making and actual enforcement. Moreover, excessive use of settlement is also a unique characteristic of U.S. securities law enforcement. This Article proceed first with introducing the overall enforcement structure of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, and then attempting to understand the real picture by surveying every insider trading enforcement case from 2009 to 2012. Lastly, this Article will briefly discuss the merit and limits of current U.S. approach.