CEO Reputation and Earnings Management: Evidence from the Taiwanese Banking Industry

• Main Authors: Yun-Tai Gu, 古芸台
• Other Authors: Horace Chueh
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2014
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/mf86z9

碩士 === 國立高雄第一科技大學 === 金融系碩士班金融組 === 102 === A substantial body of research is dedicated to understanding the determinants of firms’ earnings management. In recent years, a new wave of literature has considered the managerial human capital dimension in explaining the quality of firms’ reporting decisions. Under the efficient contracting perspective, more-reputed chief executive officers (CEOs) are less likely to engage in earnings management. On the other hand, the rent extraction perspective argues that reputed CEOs are keen to manipulate earnings. The primary objective of this paper is to test these two competing hypotheses by using a sample from Taiwan banking industry. We find no evidence that earnings management is related to CEO reputation. In addition, the result shows that volatility of ROA exacerbates earnings management, while board size mitigates earnings management.