| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺北大學 === 法律學系法律專業組 === 102 === Insurable interest and actuarial calculations are the cornerstones of insurance. Without insurable interest, “compensation for loss” as the purpose of insurance will be difficult to reach. Besides, if insurers have only limited access to information regarding the possibility of risk and loss severity to calculate insurance amount and premium rate, the insurance system will become more like a gambling, resulting in extra wealth obtained by the insured that exceeds his/her loss. Therefore, insurable interest and actuarial calculations are the must and the most important foundation for insurance system.
The information necessary for actuarial calculations affects whether the signing of insurance contract is completed or not. In addition, rights and obligations of both parties are greatly influenced by the said information. Since the information is usually controlled by the insured, the severity of asymmetric information in insurance market appears to be significant. Several measures could serve as solutions to the problem of asymmetric information, and those measures include signaling, screening and self-selection which have been adopted in practice. The most common method is to have the insured assume the obligation of disclosure of his/her own information, which was already stipulated in Article 64 of the Insurance Act of Taiwan.
Compared to other articles discussing about disclosure obligation in Taiwan, most of the article are based on the principle of good faith and the principle of equality of the premium. Nonetheless, this article attempts to explore the disclosure obligation from the perspective of economic analysis of law. This article also studies the legitimacy of disclosure obligation and how Article 64 of the Insurance Act may be applied in a more efficient way.
|
|---|
