Algebraic Cryptanalysis of RC6 with Side Channel Information

• Main Authors: Chen-Chi Lin, 林珍綺
• Other Authors: 鄭振牟
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2014
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/71482685932075775195

碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 電子工程學研究所 === 102 === This paper details a novel chosen ciphertext attack on RC6 cipher which has been chosen as one of the finalists for AES competition (March 1999) and has been declared to be resistant to all known cryptanalysis since then. In this paper, it’ll be shown that with the aid of side channel information and algebraic analysis the attacker can recover all round keys and whitening keys by using at most 2^43 ciphertext pairs and 2^78 computations. Moreover, this paper also provides theoretic analysis of the trade-off between different oracles and the general assumption (without any side channel information given), and then proves that the distribution of round key candidates may not be uniformly random.