| Summary: | 碩士 === 東吳大學 === 會計學系 === 102 === In resent years, food safety has become a global issue since incidents occurred from time to time domestically and internationally. In Taiwan, the consumers are threatened not only by the unsafe food products from unscrupulous manufactures, but also by the goods from even the legal foreign imports. Thus, more and more researches have dedicated to find the effective inspection system to ensure the food safety. Due to the information asymmetry between the regulatory agency and the manufacturers, food producer may only interest in maximizing their profit while ignoring the food safety practice. Instead of examining the cost benefit consideration of food venders, previous studies focused on discussing the effectiveness of food quality inspection by outside institutions or authorities from the aspect of execution and management procedures. In this study, based on the food quality audit mode, the interaction between the regulatory authorities and food manufactures was analyzed to give the optimal audit policy to respond to the potential practice of food manufacturers.
The results showed that the regulatory authorities will take action to audit all the untested food product when the marginal benefit do not exceed the marginal cost of food manufacturers not outsourcing the safety test. On the other hand, depends on the cost benefit ratio, the authorities may eithers perform a full inspection or passive policy when marginal benefit went beyond the marginal cost of manufactures not outsourcing the safety inspection. In addition, when the benefit of performing a full inspection is larger or equal to the cost of manufacturers outsourcing the inspection test to outside agent, the regulatory authority may either practice a active inspection or passive policy. In conclusion, the social cost is higher when the regulatory agents execute a active inspection, which leads to higher percentage of manufacturers willing to perform an optimal inspection practice. In addition, the rate of manufactures performing an optimal inspection is lower when the fine is greater. However, the rate of food passing the inspection is uncertain when optimal audit ratio was executed.
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