Could Transparency of Information Disclosure and Evaluation System Mitigate the Negative Effect of Ultimate Ownership on Earnings Informativeness?

• Main Authors: Yi Ching Lin, 林薏晴
• Other Authors: Shing Jen Wu
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2014
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/54553009715752038989

碩士 === 東吳大學 === 會計學系 === 102 === Due to the inherent ownership structure, there is usually divergence between control rights and cash flow rights, that is core agency problem, in Taiwan. This divergence brings negative effect to earnings informativeness. This study combines the core agency problem and information transparency which is measured by “Information Disclosure and Evaluation System” to examine whether the existence of Information Disclosure and Evaluation System could mitigate the information asymmetry derived from controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. The empirical results indicate that the higher or improved information transparency could mitigate the negative effect of controlling shareholder agency problem on earnings informativeness. Furthermore, this effect becomes more evident when “Information Disclosure and Evaluation System” has a more detailed ranking mechanism.