Game theoretical analysis on hospital expense claiming strategy under global budgeting policy
碩士 === 國立雲林科技大學 === 工業工程與管理研究所碩士班 === 102 === In this study, we discuss the interactions of hospital expense claiming strategy under the global budgeting and the claim deduction policies. We adopt game theoretical method to derive a hospital strategy when claiming expenses in response to the rival c...
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Other Authors: | |
Format: | Others |
Language: | zh-TW |
Published: |
2014
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Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/4rw27h |
Summary: | 碩士 === 國立雲林科技大學 === 工業工程與管理研究所碩士班 === 102 === In this study, we discuss the interactions of hospital expense claiming strategy under the global budgeting and the claim deduction policies. We adopt game theoretical method to derive a hospital strategy when claiming expenses in response to the rival claiming strategy. Furthermore, we derive the conditions to determine when choosing excess budget is a profitable policy. Moreover, we derive the equilibrium strategies for the hospital managers. We will provide the analysis to characterize the hospitals’ equilibrium behavior; and, we present managerial insights of managers.
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