Summary: | 碩士 === 國立中正大學 === 政治學研究所 === 103 === This paper intends to study and analyze the interaction concerning Taiwan’s DPP and KMT with China from the viewpoint of game theory.
The interactive strategy between DPP and China are modeled as Evolutionary Game. If DPP take strategy which is against China for a long time, the benefits would be diminishing, and damage would be increasing. Therefore, DPP will be bound to cooperate with China in the future.
The interactive strategy between KMT and China are modeled as dynamic game and normal-form game. KMT exclude the way that talking political issues about unification or independence. However, KMT is more friendship with China; China won’t break the friendly image in the minds of Taiwanese people. Therefore, KMT and China will improve economic because China wants to build and maintain the friendly image. Both of them won’t talk political issues about unification or independence in the short time by unwritten rules.
KMT and DPP will cooperate with China in the future. However, the strategy of China is using economic influential. Economic influential of China is a great power to affect Taiwan. For this reason, both of two parties must take care of the Sovereignty of Taiwan.
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