| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立中正大學 === 勞工關係學系暨研究所 === 103 === The domestic number of labor dispute case has increased steadily in the past; the administrative authorities have often leveraged a lot of private intermediaries to coordinate such labor disputes historically; for this reason, R.O.C.(Taiwan) Government revised and effectuated the Labour Dispute Act officially on May 1, 2011; among of which, Article 11 supplemented “the mediation mode with an assigned mediator", namely, the "sole mediator" that the administrative authority in charge of labor at all levels have recommended qualified mediators progressively for training courses and further certification.
This Study emphasized on the mechanism of such sole mediator for versified labor disputes and accreditation of mediators; first of all, this Study discussed the legal theory and intervention on labor dispute cases, followed by an analysis of function of such mechanism on any act taken in such labor dispute cases, comparing and discussing R.O.C administrative mechanisms of mediation and systems developed in other countries. Further, this Study had an analysis of any and all issues encountered during operation along with effects that the existing system called "the sole mediator", might have, and discussed the conduct of mediation executed by such "mediator", subsidy censorship and review, cognition of the qualification. At last, this Study analyzed interviewee’s practical experiences from the most real-world perspective through face-to-face interviews, with a hope to provide suggestions for the improvement of the current system.
As indicated in the findings from in-depth interviews and analysis made on the literature and cases, due to regulations as to the system, if the competent authorities failed to provide administrative guide during parties’ choosing mediation approaches, lots of such cases might return back to authorities that they might be suspected to be the "player and referee" and private society is unable to play its function of reducing cases meditated by government agencies, plus that the professional or non-professional certified mediators are mixed together, a uniform ethics and exit under oversight mechanisms yet been developed as a system, either and lower level of criteria might be applied to the subsidy program grated in the cases, even though not affecting the operation during mediation, due to varied quality of mediators and low subsidy costs, quality of mediation might not be improved thereby. Therefore, we hope that the whole system would be more solid by such suggestions made in this study, and degree of reliability that the public would grant is consolidated, further improving the effectiveness of meditation, conserving resources in social and judicial litigation.
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