The Impact of Corporate Gorernace on Firm Performance: Banking as Example
碩士 === 大葉大學 === 管理學院碩士在職專班 === 103 === The followings are the empirical results from chapter four : the higher the ratio of managerial ownership of banking sectors, the better its corporate performance, showing a significantly positive correlation between the two; the higher percentage of large...
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ndltd-TW-103DYU011210162019-05-15T21:31:56Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/2b86qu The Impact of Corporate Gorernace on Firm Performance: Banking as Example 公司治理對經營績效之影響: 以台灣之銀行業為例 HUANG,HAN-JHANG 黃漢章 碩士 大葉大學 管理學院碩士在職專班 103 The followings are the empirical results from chapter four : the higher the ratio of managerial ownership of banking sectors, the better its corporate performance, showing a significantly positive correlation between the two; the higher percentage of large shareholders’ ownership of the banks, the worse its corporate performance, showing they are significantly negatively correlated ; the larger of the directors and supervisors of the banks, the worse its corporate performance, which are significantly negatively correlated ; the higher the ratio of the external directors and supervisors of the banks, the better its business performance, showing they are significantly positively relevant ; when the chairman also acts as the general manager, corporate performance will be negatively correlated ; the larger the banks , the better its corporate performance, showing a significant and positive correlation ; the higher the debt ratio of the bank , the poor its corporate performance, showing a significantly negative correlation between them; quantitative easing policy and management performance are significantly correlated . There is some difference from different periods of time : the relation between directors' shareholding ratio and return on equity before the financial crisis ( 2004 ~ 2006 ) was positively related, in the financial crisis ( 2007 ~ 2008 ) was negatively correlated, and after the financial crisis ( 2009 ~ 2013 ) was not significantly related ; as for institutional investors’holding rate and return on assets, they were significantly not related either before the financial crisis ( 2004 ~ 2006 ) or after the financial crisis ( 2009 ~ 2013 ), they were positively related only in the financial crisis ( 2007 ~ 2008 ), showing the increase of institutional investors’holding rate in the financial crisis period indeed helped corporate performance. JHANG,CHUN-BO 張椿柏 2014 學位論文 ; thesis 48 zh-TW |
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碩士 === 大葉大學 === 管理學院碩士在職專班 === 103 === The followings are the empirical results from chapter four : the higher the ratio
of managerial ownership of banking sectors, the better its corporate performance,
showing a significantly positive correlation between the two; the higher percentage of
large shareholders’ ownership of the banks, the worse its corporate performance,
showing they are significantly negatively correlated ; the larger of the directors and
supervisors of the banks, the worse its corporate performance, which are significantly
negatively correlated ; the higher the ratio of the external directors and supervisors of
the banks, the better its business performance, showing they are significantly
positively relevant ; when the chairman also acts as the general manager, corporate
performance will be negatively correlated ; the larger the banks , the better its
corporate performance, showing a significant and positive correlation ; the higher the
debt ratio of the bank , the poor its corporate performance, showing a significantly
negative correlation between them; quantitative easing policy and management
performance are significantly correlated .
There is some difference from different periods of time : the relation between
directors' shareholding ratio and return on equity before the financial crisis ( 2004 ~
2006 ) was positively related, in the financial crisis ( 2007 ~ 2008 ) was negatively
correlated, and after the financial crisis ( 2009 ~ 2013 ) was not significantly related ;
as for institutional investors’holding rate and return on assets, they were significantly
not related either before the financial crisis ( 2004 ~ 2006 ) or after the financial crisis
( 2009 ~ 2013 ), they were positively related only in the financial crisis ( 2007 ~
2008 ), showing the increase of institutional investors’holding rate in the financial
crisis period indeed helped corporate performance.
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JHANG,CHUN-BO |
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JHANG,CHUN-BO HUANG,HAN-JHANG 黃漢章 |
author |
HUANG,HAN-JHANG 黃漢章 |
spellingShingle |
HUANG,HAN-JHANG 黃漢章 The Impact of Corporate Gorernace on Firm Performance: Banking as Example |
author_sort |
HUANG,HAN-JHANG |
title |
The Impact of Corporate Gorernace on Firm Performance: Banking as Example |
title_short |
The Impact of Corporate Gorernace on Firm Performance: Banking as Example |
title_full |
The Impact of Corporate Gorernace on Firm Performance: Banking as Example |
title_fullStr |
The Impact of Corporate Gorernace on Firm Performance: Banking as Example |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Impact of Corporate Gorernace on Firm Performance: Banking as Example |
title_sort |
impact of corporate gorernace on firm performance: banking as example |
publishDate |
2014 |
url |
http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/2b86qu |
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