企業購併策略之研究-以賽局理論分析

碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 國際經營與貿易研究所 === 103 === This thesis tries to find out the interaction between firms, especially when these firms face the decision of merging. We also try to figure out the reason why these firms try to merge than stay separation. Here we design a game with some specific conditions...

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Main Author: 胡漢之
Other Authors: 謝淑貞
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/81246502163689890797
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spelling ndltd-TW-103NCCU53210182017-08-12T04:34:57Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/81246502163689890797 企業購併策略之研究-以賽局理論分析 胡漢之 碩士 國立政治大學 國際經營與貿易研究所 103 This thesis tries to find out the interaction between firms, especially when these firms face the decision of merging. We also try to figure out the reason why these firms try to merge than stay separation. Here we design a game with some specific conditions for firms to observe the process they merge and the outcomes. In this dynamic game, we design 2 layers, 3 kinds, total 4 firms to be the players of the game. Upstream firm has to make decision whether to merge the downstream firms. Then downstream firms try to merge horizontally after they receive the signal that they knows that upstream firm’s willingness to vertical merge. Here we have to kinds of downstream firms, the one who has better technology has lower marginal cost, in this thesis we assume the marginal cost to be zero. The game have 3 downstream firms totally, so the other 2 downstream firms have the same technology and have the marginal cost above zero. While the downstream firms merge horizontally, they face the uncertainty of the marginal cost changes and the rise of fixed cost, recognized as the failure of integrations. Then the upstream stick to its promise to vertical merge, it will tend to merge the downstream firm which had horizontal merge previously. The result is far beyond the expectation we had before we run this model. The inferior downstream firms will not join the game, even they won’t produce any when the superior downstream firms is vertically merge by upstream firm, no matter the downstream firms merge each other. More, the probability of success in horizontal merge will affect upstream firm to make the decision of vertical merge. The game has only two equilibriums in the end, one is all firms stay separately, and the other outcome is one inferior downstream firm will rule out from the game, and other firms will be merge to one firm and become the monopoly firm in the entire market. 謝淑貞 學位論文 ; thesis 60 zh-TW
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language zh-TW
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description 碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 國際經營與貿易研究所 === 103 === This thesis tries to find out the interaction between firms, especially when these firms face the decision of merging. We also try to figure out the reason why these firms try to merge than stay separation. Here we design a game with some specific conditions for firms to observe the process they merge and the outcomes. In this dynamic game, we design 2 layers, 3 kinds, total 4 firms to be the players of the game. Upstream firm has to make decision whether to merge the downstream firms. Then downstream firms try to merge horizontally after they receive the signal that they knows that upstream firm’s willingness to vertical merge. Here we have to kinds of downstream firms, the one who has better technology has lower marginal cost, in this thesis we assume the marginal cost to be zero. The game have 3 downstream firms totally, so the other 2 downstream firms have the same technology and have the marginal cost above zero. While the downstream firms merge horizontally, they face the uncertainty of the marginal cost changes and the rise of fixed cost, recognized as the failure of integrations. Then the upstream stick to its promise to vertical merge, it will tend to merge the downstream firm which had horizontal merge previously. The result is far beyond the expectation we had before we run this model. The inferior downstream firms will not join the game, even they won’t produce any when the superior downstream firms is vertically merge by upstream firm, no matter the downstream firms merge each other. More, the probability of success in horizontal merge will affect upstream firm to make the decision of vertical merge. The game has only two equilibriums in the end, one is all firms stay separately, and the other outcome is one inferior downstream firm will rule out from the game, and other firms will be merge to one firm and become the monopoly firm in the entire market.
author2 謝淑貞
author_facet 謝淑貞
胡漢之
author 胡漢之
spellingShingle 胡漢之
企業購併策略之研究-以賽局理論分析
author_sort 胡漢之
title 企業購併策略之研究-以賽局理論分析
title_short 企業購併策略之研究-以賽局理論分析
title_full 企業購併策略之研究-以賽局理論分析
title_fullStr 企業購併策略之研究-以賽局理論分析
title_full_unstemmed 企業購併策略之研究-以賽局理論分析
title_sort 企業購併策略之研究-以賽局理論分析
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/81246502163689890797
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