Real Options and Managerial Compensation in Asymmetric Duopoly
碩士 === 國立交通大學 === 財務金融研究所 === 103 === This article builds a real option model to investigate the investment and financing decisions in an asymmetric duopoly where the two firms’ managers are in charge of decisions and can be compensated with different fixed salaries and hold different fractions of f...
Main Authors: | Wen, Wei-Che, 顏唯哲 |
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Other Authors: | Huang, Hsing-Hua |
Format: | Others |
Language: | zh-TW |
Published: |
2015
|
Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/09864294018563847937 |
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