Can Audit Committee Reduce Tax Avoidance More than the Supervisors in Taiwan?

• Main Authors: Meng-Ting Tsai, 蔡孟婷
• Other Authors: Jenn-Shyong Kuo
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2015
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/26588096857946723550

碩士 === 國立臺北大學 === 會計學系 === 103 === The United States has implemented the audit committee since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and Taiwan (R.O.C.) followed up by enacting provisions regulating audit committee’s set-up in public companies in 2006, expecting to enhance the effectiveness of corporate governance. According to Lisic (2014) and Hsu, Wen-Hsin (2010), enterprises adopting audit committee reduce their earnings management. This paper aims to discuss whether audit committee will be more effective in inhibiting enterprises’ tax avoidance activities than supervisor scheme. The research takes domestic listed firms as samples during the period of 2007 and 2013, utilizing book-tax difference, GAAP effective tax rate (Hanlon and Heitsman 2010) and permanent book-tax difference (Frank 2009) as three indexes of tax avoidance activities. The study is divided into two parts: the first one is full-data analysis, and the second one uses Propensity Score Matching (PSM) to select matched samples for further analysis. The empirical results of both parts suggest that those enterprises setting up audit committee have less tax avoidance behavior, and therefore, audit committee is proven to be more effective to deter enterprises from tax avoidance than the supervisor scheme.