A Study on the Earnings Management of State-owned Enterprises

• Main Authors: LEE,KO-MIN, 李克敏
• Other Authors: SU, YU-HUI
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2015
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/04695980488263271572

碩士 === 東吳大學 === 會計學系 === 103 === The impact caused by the rates of fees and charges of public utilities is huge. The general public has some different opinions toward the amounts of performance bonuses issued by state-owned enterprises especially after the event of “rising of both gasoline and electricity rates” in 2012. The study aims to explore that if the performance bonus system for state-owned enterprises in 2013 triggered the motive for the management of state-owned enterprises to utilize earnings management to raise the performance in order to obtain the bonuses and was the tool of earnings magement. Literature review and the method of case study were adopted anin the study. With the concept of total accruals equals to the net profit deducted with the operating cash flow of the period proposed by Healy (1985) and the “general indicators for earnings manipulation” for enterprises proposed by William W. Sheng (1997), the investigation of the motives and behaviors of earnings management in the fiscal information of 8 state-owned companies from 2004 to 2013 was performed. The empirical results indicate that there were abnormal correlations between the net profits after taxation and operating cash flows of some of the state-owned enterprises, which suggests the traces of performing earnings management. Furthermore, for the state-owned enterprises which accomplish the estimated annual goals for net profit before taxation, the depreciation of fixed assets, loss of allowance for price reduction of inventory, accounts receivable and allowance of notes for bad debts of them seems to have the abnormal condition of being utilized in earnings management in order to reach the performance goals. Finally, it was found that the accomplishment rates of the earnings before taxation of the 8 state-owned companies in the fiscal year of 2013 had no significant difference in increase compared to the annual accomplishment rates of the companies from the fiscal year of 2004 to 2012, which means that the behaviors of earnings management of the state-owned enterprises after the change of the performance bonus system has no significant change in comparison with their past behaviors in the period before the system was changed.