CEO compensation, board compensation and reserve error - Collusion in U. S. property-casualty insurance industry
碩士 === 淡江大學 === 保險學系保險經營碩士班 === 103 === This thesis aims to investigate whether board members and CEO collude to manipulate loss reserve in U.S. property-casualty insurance industry. Because there may exist an endogeneity problem between CEO compensation and board compensation, this thesis uses both...
Main Authors: | Liang-Ching Hung, 洪良慶 |
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Other Authors: | Hui-Wen Tang |
Format: | Others |
Language: | zh-TW |
Published: |
2015
|
Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/5r5u5q |
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