CEO Compensation Structure and Firm Performance during the Financial Crisis

• Main Authors: Mei-Siou Lin, 林美秀
• Other Authors: Chih-Liang Liu
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2015
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/25019354777314844344

碩士 === 國立雲林科技大學 === 財務金融系 === 103 === Using non-financial firm as sample from 2007 to 2009, this paper considers the role of inside debt in compensation structure, further exploring bilateral relationship between CEO compensation and corporate performance. Specifically, it is to examine the effects of equity- and debt-based compensation on performance and, in contrast, the effects of performance on equity- and debt-based compensation. The empirical evidence shows that CEO compensation causes future performance, instead of current performance. In addition, there is a negative relation between inside debt and future performance, supporting the argument that inside debt leads to executive conservatism. However, in contrast, it is found that the relation between equity-based compensation and future performance is positive, suggesting that equity-based compensation provide incentives for executives for aligning company interest to improve future performance.