Earnings Management of Family Firms

• Main Authors: SHU-FEN CHEN, 陳淑芬
• Other Authors: WEI-JU YANG
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2016
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/25462787066003267663

碩士 === 朝陽科技大學 === 會計系 === 104 === Family shareholdings are very common and occupy a large portion in the world economy. Under the definition of TEJ’s family business, we measure earnings management by including earnings smoothing and discretion to study the relationship between characteristics of family firms and earnings management of Taiwanese listing firms from 2005 to 2014. We find that the interests of family block holders are of no conflict to that of nonfamily shareholders. Comparing with widely-held firms, family-owned firms do not appear to use their controlling position to expropriate benefits from minority shareholders. However, the greater the families ownership, the more the entrenchment effect happened. Firms with significant ownership of block shareholders (with control right) are less likely to manage earnings. The family firms groups do not show significant earnings management. The board size of family firms has negative relation to earnings management. The results also show that firms improve in quality of financial statements in sample period, but not for firms with chairman and CEO from family members.