A Study on the Relationship between Share Collateralization by Directors and Corporate Cost of Capital
碩士 === 大葉大學 === 管理學院碩士在職專班 === 104 === Corporate directors cash their stocks through collateralizing their shareholdings to commercial banks. As the director's pledge ratio increases, the directors transfer the corporate risks to the commercial banks, which results in the moral hazard problem....
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| Format: | Others |
| Language: | zh-TW |
| Published: |
2016
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| Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/65927346430992071469 |
| Summary: | 碩士 === 大葉大學 === 管理學院碩士在職專班 === 104 === Corporate directors cash their stocks through collateralizing their shareholdings to commercial banks. As the director's pledge ratio increases, the directors transfer the corporate risks to the commercial banks, which results in the moral hazard problem.
This study investigates whether the director's pledge ratio affects corporate cost of capital. The sources of corporate capital include debt and equity. The empirical results indicate that the director’s pledge ratio has positive impact on corporate cost of debt. However, there’s no significant impact on the cost of equity. The result implies that debt holders are more concerned about the proportion of shares collateralized by the directors.
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