An Investigation into Merleau-Ponty's Institution

• Main Authors: Chan, Cheng Hsueh, 詹承學
• Other Authors: Huang, Kuan Min
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2016
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/78573969401434211424

碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 哲學系 === 104 === The present thesis is dedicated to an investigation into M. Merleau-Ponty’s (1908-1961) notion of “institution”, which he appropriated from E. Husserl’s (1859-1938) notion “Stiftung.” Through this investigation, we propose, firstly, to examine the relationship between Merleau-Ponty’s thinking and Husserl’s; secondly, to relocate the notion of institution in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy enterprise. Starting from a brief inspection upon Husserl’s texts, we illustrate the development of the notion of “constitution” (Konstitution) as well as that of “institution.” The former appears frequently throughout his philosophy as an ever-changing notion to elaborate the function of pure consciousness; the latter mainly in his later work as the structure of ideal meanings which persist in history. Subsequently, we move to a discussion on institutional phenomena - institution of life, sentiment, artwork, knowledge and public institution - in Merleau-Ponty’s twin courses during 1954-1955, and also on the criticism he forged against philosophy of consciousness and the Hegelianism of history. Lastly, in light of contrasting their thinking, we validate Merleau-Ponty’s criticism against Husserl’s philosophy of consciousness in 3 dimensions. And additionally, by tracing expressivity as an implicit connexion between the earlier Merleau-Ponty and the later, we affirm institution as a keystone in his entire philosophy enterprise. Merleau-Ponty develops his philosophy, on one hand, by following Husserl’s return to “lifeworld” (Lebenswelt), and, on the other hand, with intent to surmount the inherent limitations of Husserl’s idealism. The notion of institution, as Merleau-Ponty conceives it as a reception of fecundity from the past and an opening to a future, not merely paves the way for methodological account of History, but proves itself to be a milestone of Merleau-Ponty’s departure from philosophy of consciousness unto his new ontology.