Bargaining Power and Takeover Premium

• Main Authors: SEHN, TZU-YU, 沈姿余
• Other Authors: Vivian W. Tai
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2016
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/45479020632502828509

碩士 === 國立暨南國際大學 === 財務金融學系 === 104 === Using U.S. mergers over the period from 1984 to 2014 as a sample, this study establish a link between acquirer’s bargaining power and takeover premium. The results indicate that acquirers with greater bargaining power are unwilling to paid higher price to takeover targets. Further, merger type and target size are also considered in the association between bargaining power and takeover premium. We find that acquiring firms with greater bargaining power provide less influence on diversifying takeover premium relative to non-diversifying mergers. Additionally, the negative impact of acquirers’ bargaining power on takeover premium is weaker for large targets than small targets. Finally, I also examine the influence of bargaining power on post-merger operating performance. The results show that the post-merger operating performance improves significantly as bargaining power increases. The finding indicates that the bargaining power of acquiring firms can persistently provide positive influence on operating performance even after merger.