| Summary: | 博士 === 國立中央大學 === 產業經濟研究所 === 104 === This dissertation is mainly discussed about the seller’s and the buyer’s behavior in online auction marketplace, including the seller’s choice of auction formats, the buyer’s bidding strategies. I study the relationship between the seller’s auction-format choice and the characteristics of the product, the seller’s information, and auction information. Furthermore, I also investigate the effects of product uncertainty for the transaction if iPhone 4s.
The first part empirically studies the auction behavior of the sellers. Firstly, we will discuss what kind of information the sellers on eBay would consider before the auction mechanism such as product information, sellers’ information, and the auction information and learn if these said factors would have any impacts on the sellers’ auction mechanism. In the meantime, we also consider how the sellers’ previous information might influence the current selection of auction formats. Previous information includes the accumulative experiences of the successful rate, the last transaction price and the accumulative rate of the sellers’ auction mechanism, etc.
As to the second part, I analyze how competitive the bidding is in online auction. Several articles in the past have discussed that the buyers’ bidding strategy would not be influenced by the competition of other auctions. Thus, this article will not only focus on the impact of the competition of other auctions on the buyers’ bidding strategy but also further discuss the impact of the characteristics of other auctions on the buyers’ bidding strategy. This data is also derived from the data of motor auctions on eBay. We discovered the number of Buy-it-Now auctions and bidders from other competitive auctions have an effect on the number and time of buyers’ bidding whereas the number of Pure Auction auctions and its bidders do not have the same effect as Buy-it-Now Auctions on the bidding competition. Seller’s feedback and their scores would also encourage the number of bidding from buyers. Meanwhile, we also learn that the vehicles without warranty will decrease the number of bidding while the high mileage of the vehicles would also escalate the number of bidding. Furthermore, regarding bidding time, we discover that the average of the remaining time before ending of the auction is approximately 3000 minutes, which also implies vehicle auction is not a highly competitive product on eBay auctions. Besides, the number of bidders and number of bidding as well as vehicle warranty would also increase the chance of late bidding by the buyers in order to win the product. However, the longer launching duration of the product, which also means the longer duration of competition with Pure Auctions and Buy-it-Now Auctions from other auctions, would also force the buyers to bid early in order to decrease the cost of tracing products. The result of the study suggests that the buyers would consider every possible aspect of the auctions before they make a decision of bidding in order to increase the rate of closing the deal as well as lower the cost of the transaction.
The last part investigates asymmetric information of the transaction between the buyers and sellers in online auctions to further discuss the transaction of iPhone 4s on Taiwan Yahoo! Auction in the fourth chapter. The information asymmetry of the auction would increase the sense of uncertainty of the buyers, which deep down is caused by the distrust in the sellers and the products’ quality. The buyers’ distrust in sellers might also be eased by the seller’s credibility of the transaction, and the revealing of the product information might also minimize the buyers’ distrust in the product quality. For the seller’s transaction, a warranty, the quantity of product photos, and quality of product photos are important factors. However, this information may lead to a fruitless result if product quality revealed is not up to standards.
This article is mainly addressing the relation between the sellers’ auction behavior, the buyers’ bidding decision and the information asymmetry of the auctions. We also would like to find out the result to the buyers and the sellers on the internet platforms via our verification and analysis of the study in order further to provide them a solution to making the most appropriate and precise strategies during the auctions.
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