Director Compensation, Board Structure and Firm Performance :Comparing Family Firms and Non-family Firms

• Main Authors: Lin,Ya-Wan, 林雅婉
• Other Authors: Wu,Ming-Cheng
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2016
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/m675qe

碩士 === 國立彰化師範大學 === 財務金融技術學系 === 104 === In Taiwan, director compensation has been disclosure respectively since 2004. Based on data of listed companies on Taiwan Stock Exchange(TWSE) during 2005~2013, using multiple regression to examine the effect of director compensation and board structure on firm performance. We divided the director compensation from its structure into non-incentive compensation and incentive compensation. Furthermore, we take the factors of family and corporate governance into consideration. The results show that firm performance is influenced positively by incentive compensation, not by non-incentive compensation. We also find that the board of directors can function effectively if members of the board should not be excessive and the proportion of independent directors should be greater. But firm performance is not influenced significantly by CEO duality. Compared to non-family firms, the amount of the members in the board has a negative impact on the firm performance and board independence has monitoring effect obviously in family firms.