STRATEGIC INPUT OUTSOURCING AND TARIFF POLICY

碩士 === 國立東華大學 === 經濟學系 === 104 === This thesis constructs a three-firm trade model to examine the strategic tariff policy of the domestic country, when the foreign firm strategically outsources the entire quantity of its input production to the supplier with an input price higher than its in-house c...

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Main Author: Damiana Simanjuntak
Other Authors: Wen-Jung Liang
Format: Others
Published: 2016
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/98f8w4
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spelling ndltd-TW-104NDHU53890122019-05-15T23:01:37Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/98f8w4 STRATEGIC INPUT OUTSOURCING AND TARIFF POLICY STRATEGIC INPUT OUTSOURCING AND TARIFF POLICY Damiana Simanjuntak Damiana Simanjuntak 碩士 國立東華大學 經濟學系 104 This thesis constructs a three-firm trade model to examine the strategic tariff policy of the domestic country, when the foreign firm strategically outsources the entire quantity of its input production to the supplier with an input price higher than its in-house cost. The result shows that the social welfare is higher under in-house production than under outsourcing at a certain range of tariff. Thus, the domestic government can induce the foreign firm to choose in-house production by setting the tariff at this range, while considering that the tariff must meet the foreign firm’s requirement to switch from outsourcing to in-house production. Moreover, this tariff can be negative i.e., a subsidy if the foreign firm’s marginal cost is sufficiently high. Wen-Jung Liang 梁文榮 2016 學位論文 ; thesis 26
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description 碩士 === 國立東華大學 === 經濟學系 === 104 === This thesis constructs a three-firm trade model to examine the strategic tariff policy of the domestic country, when the foreign firm strategically outsources the entire quantity of its input production to the supplier with an input price higher than its in-house cost. The result shows that the social welfare is higher under in-house production than under outsourcing at a certain range of tariff. Thus, the domestic government can induce the foreign firm to choose in-house production by setting the tariff at this range, while considering that the tariff must meet the foreign firm’s requirement to switch from outsourcing to in-house production. Moreover, this tariff can be negative i.e., a subsidy if the foreign firm’s marginal cost is sufficiently high.
author2 Wen-Jung Liang
author_facet Wen-Jung Liang
Damiana Simanjuntak
Damiana Simanjuntak
author Damiana Simanjuntak
Damiana Simanjuntak
spellingShingle Damiana Simanjuntak
Damiana Simanjuntak
STRATEGIC INPUT OUTSOURCING AND TARIFF POLICY
author_sort Damiana Simanjuntak
title STRATEGIC INPUT OUTSOURCING AND TARIFF POLICY
title_short STRATEGIC INPUT OUTSOURCING AND TARIFF POLICY
title_full STRATEGIC INPUT OUTSOURCING AND TARIFF POLICY
title_fullStr STRATEGIC INPUT OUTSOURCING AND TARIFF POLICY
title_full_unstemmed STRATEGIC INPUT OUTSOURCING AND TARIFF POLICY
title_sort strategic input outsourcing and tariff policy
publishDate 2016
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/98f8w4
work_keys_str_mv AT damianasimanjuntak strategicinputoutsourcingandtariffpolicy
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