| Summary: | 博士 === 國立中山大學 === 政治學研究所 === 104 === This paper study the impact of different parliamentary oversight systems designs under semi-presidentialism upon practical oversight behaviors,and chosen Taiwanese seventh Legislative Yuan and French thirteen National Assembly for comparison, to see whether their oversight behaviors were influenced by their oversight system designs or not.
The research design of this paper starts from different sub-operation types of semi-presidentialism, from this departure points, Taiwan is belongs to “president-parliamentarism”, France is “premier-presidentialism”, and we were expected to have a more strong president, France were expected to have a more powerful prime minister. Therefore, for the purpose of the separation of powers, we will prefer a strong legislature to check and balance the power of president, but French system are not design to resist the power of prime minister. For this reason, this research make an assumption that no matter in which kind of issues, our parliamentary system can have more strong oversight behaviors. But naturally, the result of oversight practice will have variations depends on issues, so this paper chosen bureaucratic issues, nuclear energy issues, and national defense issues for observation.
The results of comparison are as follows: Legislative Yuan has more strong supervision force in oral question in all three issues, especially in national defense one; others representations of oversight index are variable and depends on issues. For example, in bureaucratic issues, Legislative Yuan has more strong oversight behavior in the proposition of bills, and the accepted bills are more often come from legislators too; in nuclear issues, he is more active in proposition of bills and committee examination; and lastly, in national defense issues, the French National Assembly are more active in other oversight index except question one, and the committee hearing and report publishing are their niches.
In conclusion, from the results of practical oversight behaviors which this study observed, this paper concluded that our parliamentary oversight system design might have the effect on encouraging parliamentary members to propose bills, which is a very important character of congress of presidentialism, while French parliamentary system have the characters of emphasis on administrative efficiency and brainstorming, which is aims to support the cabinet to govern.
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