Level 3 Fair Value Disclosures and Crash Risk

• Main Authors: Yi-Ju Sung, 宋怡儒
• Other Authors: 許文馨
• Format: Others
• Language: en_US
• Published: 2016
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/00823338075729808651

碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 會計學研究所 === 104 === In response to the harsh public criticism of the inadequate disclosures mandated by SFAS No. 157, Fair Value Measurements, the FASB issued ASU (Accounting Standards Updates) 2010-06, Improving Disclosures about Fair Value Measurements, and ASU 2011-04, Amendments to Achieve Common Fair Value Measurement and Disclosure Requirements in U.S. GAAP (the Updates hereafter), in an effort to further increase the reporting transparency, especially for Level 3 measurements. Using annual reports of banking firms, I examine whether the increased fair value disclosures by the Updates can effectively decrease “crash risk”, defined as the frequency of extreme negative stock returns. In support of the hypothesis, I find that firms, especially for those with Level 3 estimates, experience a decrease in crash risk after the Updates. In the additional test, I find evidence that firms with high Level 3 transaction volume experience a decrease in crash risk after the amendment to disclosures of Level 3 activity by the Updates. This suggests that the enhanced disclosures about transactions of Level 3 measurements can effectively reduce stock price crashes. Moreover, I find evidence that managers operating in firms with strong corporate governance show a lower tendency to conceal bad news, leading to lower stock price crash risk. Therefore, the impact of the Updates on bad news hoarding, thus crash risk, is limited. Taken together, my results are consistent with increased transparency from the Updates reducing crash risk among U.S. banking firms.