Share Collateralization by Directors, Information Competition and Stock Repurchase
碩士 === 國立雲林科技大學 === 會計系 === 104 === This study hypothesizes and tests whether high share collateralization by directors is positively associated with a firm’s stock repurchase and whether information competition can mitigate this relationship. This study uses three proxies for information competitio...
Main Authors: | KAO,YU-LIN, 高鈺琳 |
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Other Authors: | CHEN,CHING-LUNG |
Format: | Others |
Language: | zh-TW |
Published: |
2016
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Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/84018746410634724160 |
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