The Relationship between Director and Supervisor's Self-interest Behavior and Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance

• Main Authors: 陳湘菱 CHEN, SIANG-LING, 陳湘菱
• Other Authors: CHANG, WEN-WU
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2017
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/24qfbk

碩士 === 真理大學 === 經濟學系財經碩士班 === 105 === Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation in order to strengthen the listing of the company's information disclosure, under the "Corporate Governance Center" project at the Market Observation Post System, the 2006-2004 loss was reported for two consecutive years, but the total amount of remuneration of directors and supervisors or the average increase in the remuneration of each supervisor of the board of directors, the company will only recognize the self-interest behavior of the company. In this paper, the Taiwan listed cabinet company as a research object, the use of Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) and the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation on the definition of directors and supervisors and other information, quoted Wang and Chen (2011) hypothesis, plus insured supervisor responsibility for risk research. To explore the company in the insured directors’ and officer’ liability insurance under the protection of the relationship between director and supervisor's self-interest behavior, and how the self-interest behavior of the director and supervisor's will be under the protection of the insured directors 'and officers' liability insurance? Whether it will be due to the insured directors 'and officers' liability insurance staff liability insurance and reduce the self-interest behavior of directors and supervisors, or will not reduce the self-interest behavior of directors and supervisors.The empirical results show that the core agent problem is related to the degree of self-interest of the supervisors under the directors' and officers' liability insurance, but the core agent problem is not related to the profitability of the supervisor.