Effects on Company Performance with Regards to Board Structure and CEO Salary –on the Objects of Electronic and Conventional Corporates

• Main Authors: Huang, Hsiao-Ling, 黃小玲
• Other Authors: Chen, Chen-Yu
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2017
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/dnq9zn

碩士 === 長榮大學 === 經營管理研究所 === 105 === Abstract This research investigates the effect of board structure and CEO salary on the corporate financial performance for a sample of companies listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange under electronics and conventional industries during the post financial crisis period. The results indicate, first, a negative correlation between the board size and the firm. That is, the smaller the board size, the better the firm performance. Next, the study finds the higher the independent board director ratio tends to improve the corporate performance. It meets the theory of consolidate interest hypothesis. Also, as the theory of convergence interest hypothesis implies: when the directors’ interest are on the same side of the investors, the agency cost will be decreased and the corporate value will be increased, therefore, this study looks into the directors’ shareholding ratio and confirms a positive correlation between such ratio and corporate performance. Furthermore, for the association between CEO duality and firm performance, the results show that CEO duality has a positive impact on the firm performance. In this case, CEOs are able to receive more information to make better decisions. Finally, the study results demonstrate that in electronics industry, there is no correlation between CEO salary and corporate performance; however, in conventional industry, CEO salary is positively correlated with firm performance, which meets the theory of Holmstrom(1979): if CEO salary is connected with firm performance, the principal–agent problem will be solved and CEO will be incentivized to make the best policies to accelerate firm effectiveness and firm performance.