The effect of corporate governance on the usage of tax havens

• Main Authors: Yeh, Shen Yi, 葉申誼
• Other Authors: Su, Wei Jie
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/g34xmu

碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 國際經營與貿易學系 === 105 === Does corporate governance affect the usage of tax havens? Establishing offshore companies in tax haven is an ethically controversial business practice, enabling companies to evade tax or hide illegal activities. Because tax havens offer a favorable tax to its taxpayers and they maintain a system of financial secrecy, numerous companies choose tax haven as a way to reduce or avoid tax. The purpose of this study is to examine what kind of corporate governance will make companies be more likely to set offshore companies in tax havens. I argue that corporations with professional managers compared with other companies would have a better corporate governance. Generally, professional manager possess professional managing abilities that can inhibit companies from processing illegal or unethical practice, so it will take companies to a good direction. As a result, I argue that companies with professional managers are less likely to set affiliated companies in tax havens. Nevertheless, family corporation or the companies with controlling shareholders have a worse corporate governance. Since they might deprive public profits for private interests so that their corporate governance would become worse. Therefore, I argue family corporate and companies with large shareholders are more likely to establish offshore companies in tax haven. The evidences show that family corporations and companies with large shareholders are more likely to set up companies in tax haven; however, professional managers’ companies are less likely to set offshore affiliates in tax haven.